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An old poor law on the Continent?
Agrarian capitalism, poor taxes, and
village conflict in eighteenth-century
coastal Flanders†
By THIJS LAMBRECHT and ANNE WINTER ∗
Poor relief provisions in early modern Europe are often considered to have been
characterized by a divide between a uniform, compulsory, tax-based, and relatively
secure and generous poor law ‘system’ in England, and themore haphazard, voluntary,
relatively parsimonious, insecure, and predominantly urban relief practices on the
Continent. In this article we challenge these assumptions by arguing that the spread
of agrarian capitalism in coastal Flanders fostered a reorganization of poor relief that
displayed many features considered unique to the English old poor law, including the
levying of poor taxes. By exploring the introduction, diffusion, and effects of poor
taxes in the rural district of Furnes in the second half of the eighteenth century, we
demonstrate that poor taxes were not unique to England, and sharpen our comparative
understanding of the causes, implications, and conflicts associated with this particular
way of raising revenue for the poor. This supports ourmore general contention that the
influence of the normative framework should not be overstated: more than differences
in legislation, similarities in socio-economic development can explain variations in
relief practices in preindustrial Europe.
W hile levels of social spending in early modern Europe were low whencompared to the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, preindustrial poor
relief played a vital role as a safety net for individuals and a safety valve for
society.1 One aspect crucial to its societal implications was how poor relief was
financed. Compulsory poor taxes have in this respect often been considered a
singularity of the English poor law ‘system’, in contrast to the more haphazard
relief practices on the Continent, which were financed primarily by voluntary
charity. By analysing the emergence and spread of poor taxes in the rural district of
Furnes in coastal Flanders in the eighteenth century, this article aims to reconsider
both the purported uniqueness of preindustrial English poor relief and the causal
connections between poor relief and economic development. We will argue that the
development of poor taxes in this particular region was fostered primarily by the
expansion of agrarian capitalism. The more general contention is that the influence
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of the normative framework should not be overstated: more than differences in
legislation, similarities in socio-economic development can explain variations in
relief practices in preindustrial Europe. To the extent that Continental regions
witnessed dynamics towards agrarian capitalism similar to those observed in early
modern England, the organization of poor relief could display features considered
characteristic of the old poor law, including relatively high levels of spending, strict
definitions of settlement, a growing preoccupation with the ways in which relief
was distributed, and the expansion of poor taxes.
In order to develop the argument, the first section will delve deeper into the
various claims about the distinctiveness of English and Continental poor relief in
the early modern period, and about the role of poor taxes. Turning to our case
study, in the second section we will show how agrarian transformations towards
large leasehold farms in the district of Furnes fostered increasing pressures on
existing relief provisions in the course of the eighteenth century. In the third section
we will investigate the institutional rearrangements in the domain of poor relief
administration that took place around 1750 as a response to these challenges. The
fourth section will focus on the spread of poor taxes in the second half of the
eighteenth century. A fifth and final section will examine some of the intense local
discussions on the question of how these poor taxes were to be levied, which in
essence revolved around the question of who was to pick up the welfare bill of
agrarian capitalism.
I. An old poor law on the Continent?
The Elizabethan poor laws (1598–1601) are generally identified as having provided
the basis for an early modern welfare ‘system’ that was unique to England and
Wales, based on the obligation for each parish to take care of its own poor.
The features identified as most exceptional were the development of an elaborate
settlement legislation—ensuring that every pauper had a parish to turn to—and an
elastic income structure financed by an obligatory local poor tax. As a result, by the
eighteenth century the English relief system would have been far more uniform,
generous, and secure than that on the Continent, where legislation was disparate
and relief provisions were more irregular, were concentrated in towns, were
governed by diverse ideas of entitlement, and were financed mainly by charity and
therefore highly variable in the level of relief provided.2 The consequences of this
English welfare system are deemed wide-ranging: by providing a relatively secure
buffer against income loss, the old poor law has been credited with facilitating
wage dependency and labour mobility, and therefore easing, if not enabling, the
region’s precocious transition to agrarian capitalism and industrialization.3 While
we concur that the development of capitalismwent hand in handwith the expansion
of public poor relief, we will deconstruct the ‘national’ dimension to the argument
and reverse the causality by showing that regions outside England that engaged in
commercialized, capital-intensive agriculture could display similar dynamics.
The alleged uniformity and uniqueness of the old poor law have already been
subject to a number of critical observations in recent years. Several local studies
2 Hufton, Poor; Slack, English poor law; Solar, ‘Poor relief ’; Solar and Smith, ‘Old poor law’.
3 Taylor, ‘Impact’; Solar, ‘Poor relief ’; Solar and Smith, ‘Old poor law’; Patriquin, Agrarian capitalism.
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on England and Wales have highlighted the great variety of types and amount of
relief provided, the many problems associated with definitions of belonging and
entitlement, and the high level of discretion applied when identifying ‘deserving’
and ‘undeserving’ poor—resulting in a system that was far less uniform and secure
than earlier accounts envisaged, displayed great regional and local differences,
and entailed a high level of uncertainty among the poor as to whether and how
they would be relieved in times of need.4 In regional terms, in contrast to a
relatively parsimonious north-west, the eighteenth-century grain-growing south-
east has been identified as the heartland of an old poor law regime with relatively
high levels of spending for relatively many recipients.5 This has been associated
with strategies by large-scale, capitalistic farmers who used their political power
over relief administration to maintain a ‘reserve army’ of labour in situ for their
increasingly seasonal labour demands, by using outdoor allowances as unofficial
unemployment benefits.6 In social terms, this has been associated with a greater
need for safety nets to compensate for the vulnerability of wage-dependency, and to
stabilize a potentially disruptive process of growing proletarianization and irregular
employment.7 In such analyses, the spread of agrarian capitalism was cause rather
than consequence of the old poor law regime, and socio-economic structure was
more important than legal norms in producing relatively ‘generous’ relief practices.
From a different angle, studies of Continental welfare practices—which are still
vastly understudied—have brought to light the existence of relief and settlement
practices that were at times as rigidly codified or generous as the English system,
even in the countryside.8 Together, these revisions call for a renewed comparative
investigation of the relationship between poor relief practices and socio-economic
change at local and regional rather than national levels.9
One element crucial to the socio-economic dimensions of poor relief was the
way in which it was financed. Here, the main distinction was between obligatory
taxes and voluntary charity.10 Because its intensity tended to evolve independently
or even negatively in relation to need, charity was less elastic and dependable as
a source of income than taxation.11 Although charity remained important too,12
local poor rates are therefore often considered the basis of the relative security
and generosity of the English poor law.13 While poor rates implied redistribution,
this was not necessarily from rich to poor—it all depended on how it was raised
and used, which in turn depended on manipulations by local power holders.
Very influential in this respect is Boyer’s argument that poor rates in the south-
east functioned as wage subsidies for large-scale farmers: as poor relief mainly
supplemented the wages of local labourers, the poor rate allowed large-scale
farmers to shift part of their wage costs to non-labour-employing tax-paying
4 King, Poverty; Feldman, ‘Migrants’; Hindle, On the parish?
5 King, Poverty.
6 Digby, ‘Labour market’; Boyer, Economic history, pp. 9–50, 85–150; Song, ‘Landed interest’.
7 Lis and Soly, Poverty; Patriquin, Agrarian capitalism.
8 Winter and Lambrecht, ‘Migration’; van Leeuwen, ‘Overrun’; Marfany, ‘Family’; Warde, ‘Origins’.
9 See also King, ‘Welfare regimes’.
10 Although the ‘voluntary’ nature of public giving or door-to-door collections can rightly be questioned; see
ibid., p. 55; van Nederveen Meerkerk and Teeuwen, ‘Stability’.
11 Vanhaute and Lambrecht, ‘Famine’.
12 Ben-Amos, Culture, pp. 84–126; Innes, ‘State’.
13 Slack, English poor law, p. 26.
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residents.14 Hindle has evoked the sometimes lively and bitter arguments by which
the contributions by middling and lower groups to the poor rates were denounced,
as in the complaint of one seventeenth-century observer: ‘it is a great fault in most
parishes that the meaner sort bear the most burden and not the richest’.15 While
detailed research is scarce, poor taxes appear to have spread further down the
social scale over the course of the eighteenth century.16 Furthermore, fragmentary
evidence suggests that local concern about deservingness and eligibility became
more acute the larger the contribution of middle and lower groups to the poor
rate.17 The way in which poor taxes were raised, then, influenced not only the
nature of redistribution but also conceptions of entitlement.
The existing literature suggests there was no equivalent to poor rates on the
Continent in the preindustrial period. It shows examples of occasional subsidies
from local authorities to welfare institutions, but these were ad hoc, derived from
excise income, and restricted to cities—and as such not equivalent to a structural,
dedicated poor tax. While voluntary charity could at times be as compelling as
compulsory rates, or produce funds equivalent to those raised by English poor taxes,
the political economy and elasticity associated with these sources of income was
fundamentally different.18 Therefore, the poor rate often figures as the cornerstone
of what is considered a more or less distinctive English poor relief ‘system’.19 By
evaluating the introduction, diffusion, and effects of poor taxes in the rural district
of Furnes in coastal Flanders in the second half of the eighteenth century, we will
demonstrate that poor taxes were not unique to England, and at the same time
sharpen our comparative understanding of the socio-economic causes and local
conflicts associated with this particular way of raising revenue for the poor.
II. Agrarian transformation and relief dependence in the district
of Furnes
We focus our case study on the rural district of Furnes (Kasselrij Veurne) in the
coastal areas of the Southern Low Countries,20 an exceptionally well-documented
region of 42 villages that was the first in the country to introduce poor taxes on
a large scale.21 Although local studies have sporadically signalled the existence of
poor taxes, no systematic study has ever evaluated their structural importance—
so that within Belgian historiography too the dominant contention remains that
poor taxes became important only after their legal endorsement under the French
14 Boyer, Economic history, pp. 95–9. See also Digby, ‘Labour market’; Song, ‘Landed interest’.
15 Rogers, Treatise of love, p. 215, cited in Hindle, On the parish?, p. 273, see also pp. 365–78.
16 Hindle, On the parish?, pp. 377–8; Williams, Poverty, pp. 71–4.
17 Hindle, On the parish?, pp. 376–7.
18 Grell and Cunningham, ‘Reformation’, p. 32; van Nederveen Meerkerk and Teeuwen, ‘Stability’, p. 93. See
also Lindert, ‘Poor relief ’; van Leeuwen, ‘Giving’; van Bavel and Rijpma, ‘Important’.
19 Slack, English poor law, p. 26; Innes, ‘State’, pp. 257, 263, 266–75; eadem, ‘Distinctiveness’.
20 In the rural district of Furnes, traditional seigniorial lords and the aldermen of Furnes wielded supervision
over some 13 seigniories and 42 parishes respectively. While villages organized their own business, the lords and
aldermen supervised local finances, appointed representatives in the villages, and administered justice in civil and
criminal cases. On the institutional context, see Vandewalle, De kasselrij, pp. 138–50.
21 In government reports from the 1770s the districts of Furnes and Namur were highlighted as regions where
poor taxes were raised on a regular basis. See Bonenfant, Le proble`me, p. 139. Poor taxes in the region of Furnes
also attracted the attention of foreign observers. See Damiens de Gomicourt, Le voyageur, vol. 5, p. 319.
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regime (1796–1814).22 We will draw on ordinances, correspondence, censuses,
surveys, accounts, and court cases from the district of Furnes to argue that the
reorganization of poor relief in the course of the eighteenth century emerged as a
bottom-up solution to socio-economic challenges associated with the expansion of
agrarian capitalism, quite independent of the normative framework. In this section
we will describe how the spread of agrarian capitalism in the area increased the
pressure on existing poor relief provisions in the course of the eighteenth century.
The countryside around Furnes, situated in the north-west of present-day
Belgium along the French border, was part of a coastal region that underwent
profound structural changes from the late middle ages onwards, in the course of
which small peasant proprietors were replaced by large leasehold farms.23 Already
dominant by the late sixteenth century, large leasehold farms in the Furnes region
further extended their holdings at the expense of medium-sized and small farms in
the course of the early modern period. While in 1660 farms larger than 25 hectares
occupied 46 per cent of the soil in this area, by 1780 this was 58 per cent.24 The
growth of large farms was aided by the ample opportunities to incorporate farms
that had been abandoned or destroyed during the wars with France in the second
half of the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century.25 These changes in
farm size were accompanied by changes in cultivation practices, as the production
profile of large farms gravitated towards grain production. While in the first half of
the eighteenth century 42 per cent of the acreage of large farms was reserved for
arable husbandry, by the mid-nineteenth century this was 54 per cent.26
These changes in farm size and cultivation practices left a clear imprint on the
social and occupational structure of rural communities. Tax data demonstrate how
the expansion of large farms went hand in hand with a growing number of wage-
dependent households. Around 1700, c. 80 per cent of households were taxed as
‘users’ (that is, as earning a living from agriculture), while the households of rural
craftsmen and day labourers each made up c. 10 per cent of taxpayers. By the
1760s only 60 per cent of the households were taxed as ‘users’, while the share of
craftsmen and day labourers had risen to 15 and 25 per cent respectively.27 The
engrossment of farms and the growing dominance of arable farming also brought
about changes in labour organization. Because seasonal fluctuations in labour
demand were more marked in arable farming, full-time employment opportunities
declined as employment in service was increasingly replaced by day labour on large
farms. The accounts of the large farm Ten Bogaerde in the village of Koksijde,
for instance, show how the proportion of expenditure for agricultural labour paid
to day labourers increased from 38 per cent in the 1670s to 41 per cent in the
1750s and 54 per cent by the 1760s (table 1).28 This trend is also reflected in data
22 Vanhaute, ‘De armenzorg’; Bruneel, ‘Bijstand’.
23 Thoen and Soens, ‘Family’; Dombrecht, ‘Plattelandsgemeenschappen’, pp. 59–178; Vervaet,
‘Goederenbeheer’, pp. 203–304.
24 Vandewalle, De geschiedenis, pp. 108–112; Lambrecht, ‘De Westhoek’, p. 143.
25 Lambrecht, ‘De rechtstreekse domeinuitbating’, pp. 165–74. Leasehold prices dropped sharply; see Dalle,
De bevolking, pp. 74–80. A survey launched in 1755 showed that since c. 1660 some 317 medium-sized farmsteads
in the region had been dismantled and integrated into larger holdings in the wake of wartime destructions; City
Archives Veurne (hereafter CAV), Oud Archief (hereafter OA), 320.
26 Lambrecht, ‘De Westhoek’, p. 147.
27 Vandewalle, ‘Parochierekeningen’, p. 79.
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Table 1. Wages paid to servants and day labourers at Ten Bogaerde farm in Koksijde,
1671–1768 (£ parisis/year)
Period Wages to servants Wages to day labourers % of total wages to day labourers
1671–5 681 413 38
1749–51, 1755 714 504 41
1763–68 683 789 54
Source: GSB, Accounts of the Abbey of the Dunes, 255, 259–66.
from population censuses: in 1697, 17 per cent of the population worked as live-in
servants, while a century later this was only 11 per cent—a reduction that was most
marked among women.29
Farm engrossment and the extension of arable farming also contributed to
a growing demand for migrant labourers. The region of Furnes was part of
a pull zone for migrant harvest labour stretching from the coasts of northern
France to northern Germany.30 Large farms in these regions relied heavily
upon temporary migrants drawn from the inland regions for harvest work. They
were attracted from inland regions by high wages and returned to their small
farmsteads after the harvest. Although exact numbers are absent for the district
of Furnes, the quantitative importance of migrant labour has been attested
for the neighbouring regions in northern France, which were characterized by
similar agrarian developments.31 A memoir on the economic situation of the
region of Furnes from the middle of the eighteenth century underscores the
dependency onmigrant labourers during the harvest, who were said to be employed
on the large farmsteads because the local supply of labour was insufficient.32
These simultaneous and interlinked transitions in farm exploitation and labour
organization in the eighteenth century took place in a period of relative population
stability.33 The net result of the changes in farm size, social structure, and labour
organization, then, was a radical transformation of the labour market in this region
by 1750.34 More households came to rely solely on wages for their livelihood, but
could not secure full-time employment on large farms.
The economic and social changes identified for the countryside around Furnes in
the eighteenth century show many parallels with contemporaneous developments
towards agrarian capitalism that have been described for areas of large-scale
commercial farming in England, situated primarily in the south-east. Several
studies have highlighted how the growth of large-scale, capital-intensive arable
farming in those regions went hand in hand with declining year-round employment
opportunities, especially for female labour, and a growth in the employment of
28 Great Seminar Bruges (hereafter GSB), Accounts of the Abbey of the Dunes (hereafter AAD), 255, 259–66.
The farm Ten Bogaerde was one of the largest farms in the district of Furnes, cultivating some 175 ha. of land.
29 Dalle, ‘De volkstelling’, pp. 32–4; idem, ‘De bevolking van de stad’, pp. 128–9.
30 Lucassen, Migrant labour, pp. 23–4.
31 Mendels, Industrialization, pp. 113–16.
32 CAV, OA, 320. It was estimated that French migrant labourers annually earned some 20,000 guilders during
the harvest in the region of Furnes.
33 Dalle, De bevolking, pp. 191–2.
34 See also Lambrecht, ‘Agrarian change’.
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seasonal, male, and migrant day labour.35 This resulted, among other things, in
growing pressure on relief provisions during the slack season. Social and economic
changes experienced in the rural district of Furnes resulted in similar pressures with
regard to poor relief organization in the eighteenth century. As many communities
in the district would testify, problems of underemployment and the reduction of
income opportunities led to a growing demand for poor relief and drove up financial
pressures on local relief institutions in this period. How were these challenges
addressed?
III. Towards an old poor law? Reorganizing poor relief in the
mid-eighteenth century
Poor relief in the district of Furnes, as in the rest of the County of Flanders, was
organized around parochial ‘poor tables’ (armendissen), which were established
in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Poor tables collected,
managed, and distributed all charitable resources in their parish. Their income
relied on charitable donations by village members, which could consist of land,
rights to land, annuities, cash, or goods in kind, of which the proceeds were used
to relieve the poor. The administration of poor tables was in the hands of a local
overseer of the poor (dismeester), appointed by the village council for one or two
years, mostly in consultation with the parish priest, and assisted by the village
clerk. Poor tables, in other words, traditionally derived their income from the
exploitation of previously donated resources and occasional charitable gifts, which
implied that their income base was highly inelastic.36 From the late middle ages
until the early eighteenth century there was little change in the essential functioning
of these poor tables. By mid-century, however, a swelling stream of measures on
relief administration, together with a clear trend towards rising costs, indicates that
the old charitable model was increasingly running up against its limits.
Figure 1 expresses the evolution of expenses between 1740 and 1790 for 11
parishes in the district of Furnes for which we could locate accounts for at
least some years in both the first and second half of that period.37 Although
individual parishes displayed sometimes marked fluctuations and occasionally
even contrary evolutions, the overall trend clearly was one of rising expenses.
Expenses in individual parishes increased on average by one-third between 1740
and 1766, and doubled in the following 25 years. By 1790 average annual relief
expenditure per capita stood at 4.4 £ parisis, which amounted to the equivalent of
4.4 winter day wages for a male farm labourer,38 which is comparable to average
relief expenses in England and Wales in 1783–5.39 The increase in the second half
of the eighteenth century far exceeded population growth and price inflation over
this period. The average parish population grew by 27 per cent between 1759 and
35 Kussmaul, Servants, ch. 6; Snell, Annals, ch. 2.
36 Vanhaute and Lambrecht, ‘Famine’, pp. 170–2.
37 For further details, see online app. S1, where this figure also appears in colour.
38 With a standard winter wage of 10 stivers per day, with 10 stivers being equal to 1 £ par; GSB, AAD, 99.
39 Slack, English poor law, p. 30, records an average annual expenditure on poor relief in England and Wales of
5.3 shillings per capita in 1783–5. As the average winter day wage for a male agricultural worker in this period
was 13.3d. according to Clark, ‘Farm wages’, p. 485, this implies a relief expenditure equivalent to 4.8 winter day
wages.
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Figure 1. Poor table expenses in 11 parishes, 1740–90, 1766=100 (five-year moving
average)
Sources: (all in State Archives Bruges, hereafter SAB): OA Adinkerke, 1; OA Alveringem, uncatalogued, poor table accounts;
OA Bulskamp, 7–8; OA Gijverinkhove, 32–3; OA Izenberge, 100; Kerkfabriek (hereafter KF) Kaaskerke (supplement), 2; KF
Leisele, 46–47, 58–67, 73 (accounts only for 1767–9 and 1775–77, but information on expenditure and poor taxes could be
reconstructed from excerpts of the accounts added to the poor tax lists); OA Loker, 740–81; OA Nieuwkapelle (uncatalogued),
poor table accounts (although accounts are missing for 1766–7, 1774–5, and 1778–9, deficits cleared through poor taxes could
be reconstructed from the accounts of 1768–9, 1776–7, and 1780–1); KF Oostvleteren, 18–19; KF Pervijze, 2; OA Pollinkhove,
40; OA Steenkerke, 98.
1796,40 while wheat prices in the region rose by some 35 per cent between the
1740s and the 1780s.41 As relief expenses increased by around 150 per cent over
this period, neither inflation nor population growth explains the vast and rapid rise
in expenditure during the second half of the eighteenth century.
The proliferation of measures and ordinances related to poor relief
administration from the 1730s and particularly the 1750s onwards indicates that the
traditional assets of these institutions no longer sufficed to cover the rising expenses.
In a first phase, most measures taken by local and regional authorities were aimed
at lowering exploitation and management costs, for instance by requiring free
services from village clerks and other public officials, facilitating the collection
of hereditary annuities, reducing the costs of litigation, and taking measures to
optimize income from land or windfall gains.42 When these proved insufficient,
more radical initiatives emerged to reorganize local relief practices and financing
around mid-century. The 1750s saw the conglomeration of different measures in
40 The parishes in question recorded an average of 785 inhabitants according to the 1759 census and 995
according to the 1796 census; Dalle, De bevolking, pp. 219–27.
41 Based on the price of wheat in the neighbouring town of Nieuwpoort between 1740–9 and 1780–9. Vermaut,
‘Prijzen’, pp. 77–80.
42 SAB, Registers Stad en Kasselrij Veurne (hereafter RSKV), 778, fos. 1r–v, 1033–4; SAB, KF Steenkerke,
94.
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the domain of poor relief, which together contributed to the development of a
more formalized system where criteria for entitlement as well as exclusion became
more clearly delineated and monitored, and which established the institutional
basis for the growing importance of poor taxes in the following decades. The
various measures that engendered this transformation revolved essentially around
three domains: first, settlement and out-resident relief; second, the prohibition of
begging; and third, institutional structure. We will discuss them in that order.
A person’s settlement was the parish to which that person could turn when in
need; in other words, the parish that was responsible for his or her poor relief.
Settlement regulations—rules determining to which parish one ‘belonged’—in
the early eighteenth-century district of Furnes revolved around the principle that
one gained a settlement after three years of continuous residence in a parish.
This was in line with the early seventeenth-century central legislation on the
matter.43 Because residence was the main criterion for settlement, local authorities
employed various entry barriers in order to limit and monitor immigration—
such as requiring a financial ‘security’ or ‘warranty’ from newcomers.44 When the
district of Furnes came under French rule during the Austrian War of Succession
(1740–8), settlement legislation was replaced by a simple birthplace rule, which
had been introduced in French maritime Flanders in the 1730s. When the region
returned to the Habsburg Crown following the Treaty of Aachen (1748), most local
and regional authorities wished to maintain the French system. Hence, they set up
a multilateral Convention of Ypres (1750) between local and regional authorities
on both sides of the border, which stipulated the mutual adoption of the birthplace
rule. We have argued elsewhere that the intense lobbying for the birthplace rule in
maritime Flanders around mid-century was motivated by the desire to stimulate
labour mobility in accordance with the increasingly seasonal labour demands in
the area: fixing settlement in the place of birth, rather than the place of residence,
obviated the need for immigration barriers such as warranties by ensuring that
possible (future) relief costs remained the responsibility of migrants’ places of
origin.45
Although more research is needed on the effects of the Convention of Ypres, all
available indications confirm that it indeed contributed to high levels of mobility in
the area and a great expansion of out-resident relief practices, whereby people lived
in one parish but received poor relief from another.46 By the time the Convention
started to disintegrate in the 1770s, some of its indirect consequences had become
deeply engrained in the local norms and practices surrounding poor relief, in
particular the stronger assumption of responsibility for the poor who ‘belonged’.
Our argument here is that the clearer circumscription of settlement and the growth
of out-resident relief practices in the wake of the Convention of Ypres led to a
stronger notion of responsibility towards one’s ‘own’ poor: in exchange for the
exclusion (and better even, subsidization) of immigrants’ relief needs, rural elites
in maritime Flanders assumed more formal responsibility for their ‘local’ poor.
43 Although many complicated exceptions existed: CAV, OA, 343, fo. 109; Winter and Lambrecht, ‘Migration’,
pp. 103–4.
44 Winter, ‘Caught’, pp. 144–5.
45 For more details on the ‘Convention of Ypres’, see Winter and Lambrecht, ‘Migration’, pp. 112–16.
46 Dalle, De bevolking; Vandaele, ‘Armenzorg’. On out-resident relief in England, see Sokoll, Essex pauper letters;
King, ‘“Impossible”’.
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A similar dual dynamic developed in relation to measures aimed at the
prohibition of begging. In late February 1751 the aldermen of the district of
Furnes, together with those of Ypres, Warneton, Poperinge, andWervik, petitioned
the Privy Council in Brussels to ratify their joint proposal to combat vagrancy
and poverty in their jurisdictions,47 which it did on 21 May 1751.48 Like many
other regulations of its kind, it outlawed begging and forbade almsgiving—in itself
a recurrent theme in social policies from at least the early sixteenth century.49
Yet what distinguished the 1751 decree from other bans on begging was that it
explicitly coupled this prohibition with the legal obligation for parishes to help
their poor in money or kind from the available charitable resources, and to resort
to taxation if the latter proved insufficient. Here, the increased responsibility of local
communities for their own poor—if need be, via taxation—is explicitly understood
as the necessary price for the prohibition of begging. This sense of trade-off was also
obvious in the consultation round concerning the proposal, which the aldermen of
the district of Furnes undertook among the rural parishes, most of which appeared
in favour. As the deserving poor would have to ‘gather their living in other ways’
if begging were outlawed, the aldermen of Furnes suggested introducing a weekly
bread tax among the ‘good residents . . . since these would be discharged from
giving at the door’ or to devise other measures to increase the poor tables’ income.
The proposed bread tax was thus seen as a direct compensation for the prohibition
of begging—which according to all indications was observed relatively strictly.
Whether in favour of or against a begging ban, all parishes indeed assumed that it
would increase relief expenses.50
The regional campaign for the prohibition of begging in 1751, then, emerges
as part of a conscious transformation of poor relief organization from a system
in which informal almsgiving still played an important role, to a more formal
systemwhere redistributionwas organized and controlled solely via the poor table—
reminiscent of sixteenth-century reorganizations of urban poor relief in line with
the recommendations of the poor relief reformer Luis Vives.51 A collection of
nominal poor lists from 1729 confirms that at that time begging was still tolerated
as an institutionalized means of supplementing low incomes and relieving public
relief expenses: one of the categories of poor mentioned is that of ‘young children
living with their parents . . . who beg for their bread and [therefore’ require little
or nothing from the table’.52 After 1751, these practices were effectively outlawed,
and local communities were to assume financial responsibility for the increased
relief costs this would entail. The motives for the ban on begging in 1751 appear
to have been twofold. On the one hand, a direct incentive was a similar decree in
the bordering French de´partement de Flandre a few weeks earlier, as it was feared
that this would swell the number of foreign beggars crossing the border.53 On the
other hand, as with other projects to ban begging in this period, the new ordinance
47 State Archives Ghent, Raad van Vlaanderen, 30803.
48 Vyfden placcaert-boek van Vlaenderen, vol. 2, pp. 1066–70.
49 Although mostly in cities: Lis, ‘Sociale politiek’; Lis and Soly, Poverty; van Nederveen Meerkerk and
Vermeesch, ‘Reforming’.
50 CAV, OA, 1116.
51 Lis and Soly, Poverty; van Nederveen Meerkerk and Vermeesch, ‘Reforming’.
52 CAV, OA, 1116.
53 Thuillier, Aux origines, pp. 451–70.
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was clearly intended to enhance labour discipline by ‘preventing . . . idleness and
negligence of work’. Its purpose was therefore explicitly twofold: to ‘chase the
foreign beggars from the region’ and ‘make their inhabitants from an early age
accustomed to work’.54 Here, growing responsibility for one’s ‘own’ poor appears
to have been a side effect—and calculated cost—of measures intended to increase
labour discipline and reduce informal charitable expectations.
The third and last domain in which the institutional transformation of relief
administration played out was the increasing professionalization of themanagement
of poor tables, which went hand in hand with the growing involvement of the local
community in distribution practices. The village of Roesbrugge-Haringe was one
of the first to reorganize the daily management and supervision of parochial relief
in 1754, when it decided to appoint four directors for a term between six and
eight years. Together with the overseer of the poor, the local priest, and the head
of the village council, these directors were to decide on all affairs relating to poor
relief and to meet at least once a month—reducing the role of overseer to the
mere distribution of resources.55 Other parishes introduced similar management
structures in the 1750s. In 1764 the aldermen of Furnes rendered the establishment
of such ‘vestries’ obligatory in all parishes in the district: henceforth, two or three
directors were to supervise and manage poor relief together with the head of
the village council, the parish priest, the overseer of the poor, and the village
clerk, in vestry meetings that convened at least three to four times per year, the
decisions of which were recorded by the village clerk. The directors also had
to keep detailed records on the type and value of the relief distributed to each
household. The stated motive for the reorganization was the rising costs of relief
expenses, which were attributed to the ‘many men and women who prefer idleness
over work although they are young, healthy and fit to work to make their living
. . . who rather without shame . . . and without dear necessity attempt to feed
themselves of the poor table on false pretexts’.56 Again, increasing labour discipline
via stricter control over distribution practices was clearly an underlying motive for
the managerial reorganization. The same decree also required the supported poor
to wear pauper badges at all times, and forbade them to visit taverns or other ‘public
divertissements’ or to keep dogs.57 The establishment of vestries to supervise poor
relief in these rural parishes represented a clear break with century-old traditions.
By introducing a more professional and rigid structure in the daily operation of
poor relief, village councils and the aldermen of Furnes signalled that poor relief
was too important to be left to the management of one or two overseers, and
effectively involved the tax-paying members of the community in decisions about
income and expenses.
The various measures in the domains of settlement, begging, and poor table
management aroundmid-century together implied the transformation of local poor
relief administration to a more formalized system that bore many resemblances to
the old poor law in south-east England in the eighteenth century, and included
many of the hallmarks often considered particular to the English system: clearly
54 CAV, OA, 1116.
55 SAB, RSKV, 1032. For minutes of vestry meetings, see SAB, Verzameling de Spot, 250.
56 CAV, OA, 345, fo. 11.
57 Ibid.
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defined settlement rules, a sense of responsibility towards one’s ‘own’ poor, and the
supervision of distribution practices by rural elites. It is important to realize that
this institutional transformation in the district of Furnes was largely a bottom-up
development that was not steered by legislation. Rather, it was the result of local
initiatives and experiments, that were facilitated by subsequent legal endorsement
at the regional level. The result was a clearer demarcation of relief responsibility
towards a small group of local, deserving poor, in return for a general exclusion
of migrant labour from relief provisions and greater control over the labour of the
poor. While the district of Furnes was the earliest to undergo this transformation of
relief administration, other regions in maritime Flanders recorded similar measures
in the following years.58
Why, then, did this transformation take place where and when it did? We
believe that the main reasons were the structural social changes that occurred
in the wake of the spread of agrarian capitalism, in combination with the more
contingent circumstance of being a border zone at a time of military upheaval. The
transformation of poor relief administration in many respects catered to the new
challenges posed by the predominance of large grain-growing farms, which brought
about an increase in seasonal unemployment and life-cycle vulnerability and the
growing importance of seasonal migrants as a flexible supply of labour during
peak periods. The equation of settlement to birthplace stimulated labour mobility
without any of the associated relief costs, while strict control over relief distribution
and recipients ensured the adequate mobilization of local labour. In addition, cross-
border diplomacy appears to have functioned as a catalyst for change. On the one
hand, the moving of borders over people during the War of Succession acquainted
the district of Furnes with the advantages of settlement legislation that was different
from their own. On the other hand, the moving of people over borders—in times
of both peace and war—increased the need for similar legislation and institutions
on both sides of the border: both with regard to settlement and the prohibition of
begging, the initiatives by the aldermen of Furnes were inspired by earlier legislation
on the French side of the border, where similar agrarian transformations were
taking place.59
One of the results of the reorganization of poor relief administration was a
stronger acknowledgement of responsibility for one’s own, ‘deserving’ poor. We
believe that this was an involuntary—although possibly well calculated—price
local elites had to pay for the increasing dominance of large grain-growing farms;
the benefits of flexible, subsidized migrant labour; and greater control over local
labour. Although we will see that this laid the basis for a skyrocketing of local
relief expenses—and poor taxes—in the following decades, the trade-off may still
have been worthwhile from the perspective of large farmers. First, the locally
born poor were relatively small in number compared to the number of migrant
workers: the latter’s exclusion from relief entitlements is likely to have outweighed
the former’s inclusion. Second, the relief they received in effect functioned as a
labour cost subsidy, in the sense that it reduced the need for wages to cover the
full reproductive cost of labour. Further insight into these mechanisms requires
58 For the neighbouring rural district of Bruges, see Gilliodts-Van Severen, Coutumes, pp. 323–9. See also
Lambrecht, ‘Agrarian change’.
59 Rosselle, ‘La mise en valeur’; Delleaux, Les censiers.
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follow-up research that moves beyond data on income, expenses, andmanagement,
to the reconstruction of the social and demographic profiles of relief recipients—
which is an endeavour that unfortunately falls beyond the scope of this research.60
Yet even if relief remained limited to the local ‘deserving poor’ during the most
vulnerable phases of the life cycle, such as the elderly, orphans, and single
parents, it did in effect relieve labouring families from caring for their most
vulnerable members and compensated for income deficits from a family life-cycle
perspective—and therefore still amounted to an indirect labour cost subsidy.61
Even for England, micro-research indicates that the structural widening of relief
eligibility towards the able-bodied rural poor set in only by the 1790s, and
appears to have been characteristic mainly of the exceptional circumstances of
the last decades of the old poor law, while even then these groups remained
underrepresented in relation to the more ‘classic’ types of relief recipients.62
Yet whether subsidies were direct or indirect, the benefit large farmers could
derive from such subsidies, as Boyer argues for the English south-east, ultimately
depended on the ways in which poor relief was financed.63 It is to this subject that
we now turn.
IV. Dealing with deficits: taxation and poor relief
From an early stage, local authorities in the Southern Low Countries were legally
allowed to raise taxes for the financing of local welfare institutions. In 1617, the
central government explicitly permitted villages to tax their inhabitants to support
the poor tables.64 Yet this legislation did not result in a tax-based system of poor
relief. Whereas poor rates were almost universal in English parishes by 1700,65 no
such expansion of poor taxes took place in the Southern Low Countries. The act of
1617 was essentially intended to facilitate the build-up of resources after a period
of chaos and turmoil in the late sixteenth century, when long periods of warfare
had resulted in the destruction of property, low rental income, and the loss of deeds
proving legal claims to land and annuities. As the situation improved after 1610
and demand for relief was at a low ebb, poor tables appear to have recovered swiftly
in the following years.66 To date, no data have come to light to suggest that rural
poor tables effectively resorted to taxation in the second quarter of the seventeenth
century.67 As before, poor tables again relied mainly on their own capital resources
and donations.
60 As accounts or distribution lists at best record only names, gaining insight into the social background and
family situation of relief recipients is possible only by labour-intensive record-linkage in parishes where both relief
lists and detailed nominal censuses, family reconstitutions, and/or other household listings survive, which is an
endeavour we aim to undertake in the future but falls beyond the scope of this research. For English examples,
see Williams, ‘Poor relief ’; French, ‘Irrevocable shift’.
61 Cf. van Zanden, Rise, pp. 1–18.
62 King, Poverty, pp. 164–70; Williams, ‘Poor relief ’, pp. 500–6, 516; French, ‘Irrevocable shift’, pp. 793–4.
63 Boyer, Economic history, pp. 85–118.
64 van der Meersch, ‘Notice historique’, p. 29.
65 Slack, English poor law, p. 26.
66 On economic growth in the rural district of Furnes during the first decades of the seventeenth century, see
Vandewalle, ‘Stabilite´’.
67 Visitation reports of some 40 parishes in the region of Alost from the first half of the seventeenth century do
not list taxes as sources of income of rural poor tables. See de Brouwer, Bijdrage, pp. 9–29. In cities poor relief
was partly funded from excise taxes. See, for example, Lenders, Gent, p. 89.
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Figure 2. Expenditure and income of 11 poor tables, 1740–96 (five-year moving
average, expenditure 1766=100)
Sources: As for fig. 1.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the situation had changed. As a result
of the social and economic changes taking place in coastal Flanders, poor taxes
resurfaced as a measure to compensate the increasing deficits between the income
and expenses of the poor tables. While poor table expenditure was clearly on the
rise in the half-century between 1740 and 1790, the traditional income base could
not keep up with the rising expenses. Figure 2 illustrates this by expressing the
evolution of poor table expenditure and income for the same 11 parishes as in
figure 1, indexed with expenses in 1766 as base 100. This evolution suggests the
existence of three distinct phases in the financial dissolution of the traditional
system. In the first phase, until the late 1750s, rising relief expenses could still be
compensated for by raising income—and in that sense reflect successful attempts
to expand the traditional income base at least temporarily, for instance by selling
or mortgaging properties or consolidating debts into loans. That these measures
offered temporary relief at best is clear from the divergence between expenditure
and income after c. 1755. In the first 10 years or so of this divergence, declining
income appears to have been more important than rising expenses in widening
the gap. This may have been attributable to a backlash of the last-resort strategies
employed in the previous years, in addition to the financial effects of a one-off
retroactive tax raised on non-authorized donations of land established in 1753.68
In the long run, however, and especially after 1765, the marked increase in
expenditure clearly was the prime driver of the growing deficits of parochial poor
tables. While income increased again after 1765, it never managed to keep up with
68 On this operation, see Ko¨rperich, Les lois. The tax was raised in 1753, but most institutions paid in 1755 and
1756. See Coppens, De financie¨n, p. 88. In some cases poor tables were forced to sell part of their immovable
properties to pay the tax. Many poor tables objected to this tax. For this region, see SAB, RSKV Supplement, 20.
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the galloping rise in expenditure. While expenses more than doubled between 1755
and 1790, income increased by one-third at most.
The growing problem of poor table deficits made the question of how to cover
the difference between expenses and income an increasingly pressing one. As early
as 1738, the aldermen of Furnes addressed a circular to the parishes in the region
with instructions on how to deal with deficits in relief accounts, in which poor taxes
were envisaged as one of the options to clear deficits.69 Although both regional and
local magistrates took several initiatives to raise income and reduce expenses, their
efforts were not sufficient to avoid taxation in the long run. As we will demonstrate,
a growing number of parishes resorted to taxation in the course of the second
half of the eighteenth century, while the relative weight of taxes as a source of
income increased over time. In other words, in a growing number of parishes the
cost of the maintenance of the poor was increasingly supported by the parishioners
directly. Although this was a process extending over several decades, it nevertheless
represented a clear break with the typical early modern model of rural poor relief
in the Southern Low Countries.
Although not completely absent in earlier years, the practice of raising poor
taxes appears to have spread rapidly in the years following its explicit suggestion
in the 1751 prohibition of begging.70 An enquiry launched by the aldermen of
Furnes on the income structure of poor tables in 1755 shows that poor taxes
were by then a familiar device. In their enquiry, the aldermen wished to know
the number of poor in each parish and whether some form of poor tax had been
raised in 1752 or 1753. Nineteen out of the 34 surviving returns of rural parishes
state that they supplemented the income of the local poor table with taxation
in one or both years. In most of these parishes, this was still done ad hoc and
post factum: after the closing of the accounts, taxes were levied to compensate
for the deficit observed. Only in the parishes of Oostduinkerke, Koksijde, and
Alveringem were taxes levied in advance to finance the running costs of the poor
table.71
It is important to stress that some parishes still managed to finance local welfare
costs without resorting to taxation. When the aldermen of Sint-Joris recorded a
deficit in the accounts of their poor table of 241 £ parisis in 1754, an additional
charitable effort launched by church and lay parish leaders resulted in the collection
of some 300 £ parisis in voluntary donations. In other parishes, windfall gains
deferred the introduction of poor taxes. In the village of Wulpen, for example,
deficits were compensated by the repayment of the principal of an annuity. In
Stavele the sale of trees andmaterial possessions of a deceased pauper kept the poor
table from running into debt. The parish of Kaaskerke did not raise poor taxes,
but had mortgaged its properties with an annuity of 1,200 £ parisis to finance the
losses sustained in earlier years.72 Even if deficits materialized, moreover, the most
common financial technique was to transfer deficits to the next accounting year, as
was frequently done in Loker, Steenkerke, and Adinkerke. Other options included
69 Somewhat vaguely described as ‘handvullinghe’; CAV, OA, 343, fo. 170.
70 The detailed accounts of Adinkerke indicate that taxes were already raised in the years before the 1751 act
was implemented. See online app. S1.
71 SAB, RSKV Supplement, 20. Thirty-five returns have survived, but only 34 are complete.
72 Ibid.
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Figure 3. Poor taxes as a proportion of expenditure in 13 parishes, 1740–95 (%)
Source: See online app. S1.
debt consolidation, which transformed the deficit of the poor table into the capital
of an annuity on which interest was paid at the market rate.73
These examples indicate that in the short term, poor tables had some options
to balance income and expenditure. These techniques could tide over deficits for
a couple of years, but could not maintain the financial health of these institutions
in the medium-to-long term. Windfall gains, consolidating debt into loans, and
intensified exploitation of immovable properties were temporary measures at best,
as illustrated by the fall in average income after 1755 (figure 2). Some parishes,
such as Gijverinkhove, predicted that poor taxes would become necessary to cover
the growing expenditure of local relief institutions.74 Yet this was the method of
last resort. Overseers of the poor would first exhaust all other options available
to them before applying for financial injections from the community. They would
nevertheless increasingly have to do so. The returns to the enquiry into the financial
situation of parish welfare institutions in 1807 allow us to identify the villages that
resorted to poor taxes at the onset of the nineteenth century.75 When comparing
the returns to the 1755 and 1807 enquiries, the share of parishes resorting to poor
taxes had increased further from 56 to 69 per cent.
In order to chart the evolution of poor taxes and their relative weight in the course
of this period, figure 3 summarizes the average share of poor taxes between 1740
and 1795 for all 13 parishes for which poor table accounts could be retrieved.
Although the experience was not uniform, the general trend clearly shows the
73 See the accounts for the period 1745–60 in SAB, OA Adinkerke, 1; KF Steenkerke, 98; OA Loker, 735–50.
74 SAB, RSKV Supplement, 20.
75 SAB, Leidepartement, 4196.
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increasing importance of poor taxes.76 Before 1755, only four out of the eight
parishes for which we have observations for those years organized poor taxes,
and even then not in all years—equivalent to an average share of 10 per cent of
expenditure at most. In some years and in some parishes, income from traditional
sources of revenue clearly still exceeded welfare expenses, or other ways were found
to cover deficits. The following decades marked a profound change. In the 1760s,
10 out of 11 parishes for which we have observations organized poor taxes at some
point, and their average contribution grew to over 30 per cent of expenditure. In
the 1770s, 1780s, and 1790s, all parishes for which we have observations (ten, nine,
and six respectively) organized poor taxes for at least some years each decade, while
their average contribution increased to more than half of total expenses by the early
1790s. Loker’s poor table is one of the clearest examples of this trend; here the
share of poor taxes recorded an almost continuous increase from non-existent in
the early 1750s to well over 80 per cent of expenditure in the late 1780s. In this
case, poor taxes clearly evolved from an instrument to cover temporary deficits to a
structural and major source of income. Even in parishes where the trend was more
volatile, such as in Nieuwkapelle or Izenberge, it became impossible to rely solely
on traditional sources of income, and poor taxes were increasingly resorted to in
the second half of the eighteenth century.
This analysis of the available poor table accounts indicates that the old welfare
regime was no longer able to finance the growing demand for support. A ‘mixed
economy of welfare’ had emerged in the 1750s that expanded rapidly in the second
half of the eighteenth century. Within a short time span, poor taxes claimed
their place as a structural, and in some cases dominant, contribution to welfare
expenses.77 It is important to note that this was not an automatic consequence of
legislation: raising poor taxes had been a legal possibility at least since 1617, and
was not even in the eighteenth century rendered obligatory—it was only proposed
as one of the possible measures by the regional aldermen. The returns to the 1755
enquiry demonstrate that their explicit endorsement in the act of 1751 did not
automatically result in the introduction of poor taxes: many parishes first tried to
cover rising deficits by other, often temporary, means and only reluctantly resorted
to taxation when these policies proved untenable in the long run.78
V. Poor taxes and village conflicts
As poor taxes became an ever more important device to finance rising relief
expenses, the question as to how they were to be raised and distributed within the
local community became an increasingly pressing issue, which had the potential
to divide communities and sharpen existing social contrasts. To understand why
poor taxes became a major bone of contention, it is important to put the weight
of these taxes into context. Figure 4 plots the nominal value of the poor taxes in
the village of Loker next to the direct taxation destined for regional and central
76 See online app. S1.
77 In response to a government enquiry into the financial situation of poor relief institutions in 1794–5, the
parish of Adinkerke responded that poor taxes were raised since ‘time immemorial’. See SAB, Triage van Zuylen,
1123.
78 The central government left the decision on how to balance the income and expenditure of poor relief
institutions deliberately to local authorities. See Lenders, ‘De nationale schuld’, p. 73.
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Figure 4. Land taxes and poor taxes in Loker, 1756–90 (£ parisis)
Sources: SA Bruges, Oud Archief Loker, 15–16, for land tax. For poor tax, see online app. S1.
governments. In terms of their absolute weight, the latter were by far the most
important direct taxes raised in rural communities, and were levied on the basis of
land use.79 The figure shows that direct nominal taxes in Loker rose until 1764,
and then gradually declined. As in other regions in the Southern Low Countries,
government tax demands decreased in the later decades of the eighteenth century,
in real terms even more than in nominal terms.80 Yet over the same period, the
level of poor taxes increased considerably.81 In the years 1756–68 poor taxes stood
at levels equivalent to 10 to 20 per cent of the land tax. In the next decade poor
taxes more than doubled, to levels worth half the land tax by 1776. In the following
years, poor taxes tended to decline a little relative to the land tax, but were still of
significant importance. The comparison between these two series at parish level
demonstrates that poor taxes could substantially increase the overall tax burden:
after 1774, poor taxes drove up total taxation levels in Loker by at least one-third.
The situation in Loker was certainly not exceptional. In the adjacent village of
Krombeke poor taxes increased the overall tax bill by 33 per cent in 1779 and by
25 per cent in 1787.82 In the parish of Izenberge poor taxes accounted for 14 per
cent of all direct taxes raised in 1791.83 In these communities poor taxes were far
from a marginal phenomenon compared to other direct taxes. While the financial
claims of the state declined, their decline was offset by increasing taxes for poor
relief expenses. Rising overall tax levels in the district of Furnes were therefore the
result of poor taxes.
79 Next to direct taxes destined for the government, villages also raised direct taxes to finance local expenses,
such as the fees and pensions of public officials (members of the village council, the midwife, the schoolmaster,
and the sexton), repair and maintenance of community infrastructure, legal fees, and so forth.
80 van Isterdael, ‘De invloed’, pp. 296–300.
81 See online app. S1 for poor taxes in Loker.
82 SAB, OA Krombeke, 2255, 2259, 2264–5.
83 SAB, OA Izenberge, 31.
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It should therefore come as no surprise that increasing poor taxes in this region
resulted in intense intra-parish discussions and quarrels. At the heart of these
discussions and conflicts was the question of how the increased welfare burden
was to be distributed. The act of 1751 was very vague on the question of how
poor taxes should be raised, but only stipulated that they should be paid by all
inhabitants of the parish.84 Traditionally, direct taxes were divided within rural
communities on the basis of land use, with large leaseholders paying the largest
share, and smallholders, artisans, and labourers with a small cottage contributing
only at a low fixed rate. The act of 1751, however, did not oblige parishes to
raise poor taxes along the same lines. Parishes had to obtain permission from the
aldermen of Furnes to raise poor taxes, but could decide themselves how these
taxes were raised and who should contribute. The survey of 1755 indicates that
they adopted very different methods: whereas some parishes distributed poor table
deficits in a manner similar to direct government taxes, other parishes devised a
new tax system taking into account variables other than land use.85 The choice of
one or other taxation system was the source of considerable local conflict between
different social groups, and this can be illustrated by some examples for which we
could retrieve nominal tax lists for land taxes and poor taxes, as well as additional
documentation on the discussions that ensued.
On 7 February 1761 the village council of Leisele met to discuss the deficit of
the local poor table.86 They agreed that raising a tax was the only solution, but
did not agree on how this tax should be raised. The village council considered two
options: either they could divide the poor tax along the traditional lines of land
use or implement a ‘capitation’ to divide the burden. A capitation in theory took
into account other sources of income and signs of wealth in addition to land use,
such as the number of servants and cattle, income from non-agricultural labour
or from investments, and so on.87 In theory, taxation through capitation could be
more sophisticated than a tax on land use, but an obvious caveat was the problems
associated with assessing the actual wealth of households. Whereas land use could
bemeasured and assessed easily and objectively, overall wealth was more difficult to
determine. The matter was complicated further by the voting system. Voting rights
were restricted to village officials and large-scale farmers, who received a number
of votes equivalent to the size of their holding.88 With voting rights restricted to the
landholding elite, they decided against an additional tax on land use and in favour
of a ‘capitation’: the village council drafted a tax list allocating each household to
a wealth category.
While the criteria used to distribute households over the wealth categories are
unclear, the ‘capitation’ clearly differed from the land tax distribution. Figure 5
shows the result of a nominal record-linkage between the land tax and poor tax
lists of Leisele for 1760.89 Obviously, the respective contributions to land taxes and
84 Vyfden placcaert-boeck van Vlaenderen, vol. II, p. 1069.
85 SAB, RSKV Supplement, 20.
86 SAB, Archieven van de parochies van de kasselrij Veurne (hereafter APKV), 2174.
87 The general principles used to determine the wealth of a household in a system of capitation can be found in
Stalins, Het Vlaems settingh-boecxken.
88 Only households with a holding exceeding 20 gemeten or c. 9 ha. were entitled to vote and the number of
votes rose proportionately with the size of the holding. See the voting lists for the poor taxes raised in Leisele
(1761) and Izenberge (1791) in SAB, APKV, 2174, and OA Izenberge, 111.
89 SAB, KA Leisele, 41 (poor tax), 409 (land tax).
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Figure 5. Poor tax and land tax per household in Leisele, 1760 (£ parisis)
Sources: SA Bruges, Kerkarchief Leisele, 41 (poor tax 1760) and 409 (land tax 1760).
poor taxes show a clear positive correlation (r = 0.75, p<0.001), in the sense that
all large-scale farmers (that is, those who paid high land taxes) were situated in
the upper three categories of the poor tax. However, the relation does not work in
the other direction: the upper poor tax categories also contained a sizeable number
of households who paid little or no land tax. The result was a wider distribution
of poor taxes than of land taxes: while the top 10 per cent of the households in
the land tax distribution paid 40 per cent of the total land tax, they paid only
30 per cent of the poor tax. In the parish of Alveringem, which also introduced
a ‘capitation’ to distribute its poor taxes, the tax lists for the year 1771 show an
even greater discrepancy: the households holding more than 25 gemeten (c. 12
hectares) paid 66 per cent of the total land tax, but only 36 per cent of the poor
tax.90
Shortly after the establishment of the capitation in Leisele, the village priest
together with 13 parishioners filed a complaint full of rhetoric on financial and
social injustice with the aldermen of Furnes. Central to their lengthy argument
was the objection that the poor tax was unevenly distributed. They stated that
the large-scale farmers, including the head of the village, had in effect abused their
voting power to exempt themselves and shift the tax burden to commoners.91 Their
argument was reminiscent of the lamentation of the seventeenth-century English
author of An ease for overseers of the poore: ‘the poore cannot, the rich will not, but
the middle sort must pay all’.92 Following the complaint, the aldermen of Furnes
organized and supervised a new meeting of the village council on the poor tax. At
the following council meeting, however, the vote was split between the two options
but marginally in favour of capitation—illustrating how deeply divided the village
was over the matter.93 Reportedly, social unrest spread through the community
90 SAB, OA Alveringem, uncatalogued (poor tax, 1771; land tax, 1772).
91 SAB, APKV, 2174.
92 Cited in Hindle, On the parish, p. 374.
93 SAB, APKV, 2174.
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immediately after the decision to adopt the capitation. Several residents pressured
the village clerk to burn the tax list, and various opponents, especially smallholders
and labourers, protested that they would have to sell their houses to pay the tax.
When it was rumoured that violence would be used if the tax were collected,
the aldermen of Furnes intervened and restored order by threatening the ‘unruly’
smallholders with legal action.94
Conflicts and tensions over poor taxes were not restricted to this well-
documented community. Records reveal that in other parishes, too, poor taxes
were a contentious issue. In 1754 the inhabitants of the parish of Haringe failed
to agree on whether to divide the poor tax on the basis of land use or a capitation.
The households living in the periphery of the parish, mostly on medium-sized
and large farms, favoured a capitation. Those living in the centre of the village,
mostly artisans, shopkeepers, and labourers, favoured a tax based on land use.
The village council decided to leave the contentious issue to the aldermen of
Furnes, who ruled in favour of a capitation and set the different tax groups. Some
inhabitants complained that the decision favoured large-scale farmers.95 A similar
conflict took place in the nearby village of Alveringem in the early 1770s, when
some of the village’s inhabitants protested against the decision to use a capitation
to raise the necessary poor tax. The protestors favoured a poor tax based on
land use, as was customary for all other local taxes. The capitation’s division
across wealth categories, they argued, did not reflect the true division of wealth
in the community, as large-scale farmers in particular had managed to exempt
themselves.96
These examples suggest that large-scale farmers appear to have used their
influence in the village council to minimize their own contribution to poor taxes
by favouring a capitation instead of a traditional tax division based on land use—in
ways that are reminiscent of the complaints voiced by seventeenth-century English
vestries or the tax-evading strategies attributed to eighteenth-century farmers. The
surviving records indicate that in most parishes poor taxes came to be raised via
a capitation. While the ‘wealth’ criteria used were always unclear and the number
of tax groups varied greatly from one village to the next, the net effect of the
‘capitation’ system appears to have been to distribute the tax burden among a wider
section of the community. Although more detailed, local research is needed, the
available data suggest that the net result of these local experiments was a broadening
of the tax base in the course of the second half of the eighteenth century. In the
village of Leisele in 1763, an estimated 66 per cent of all households were taxed
to raise a total of 1,882 £ parisis for poor relief, while by 1777 no less than 85
per cent of households contributed to a poor tax of 2,389 £ parisis in total. This
went hand in hand with a reduction in the contribution of the top 20 per cent of
households from 63 to 57 per cent, and a disproportionately small increase in the
maximal contribution from 25 to 27 £ parisis for the highest wealth category—
that is, around five weeks’ wages for an agricultural labourer.97 In Alveringem in
94 SAB, APKV, 2174.
95 SAB, APKV, 2214.
96 SAB, OA Alveringem, uncatalogued (poor tax 1771).
97 SAB, KA Leisele, 58 (poor tax 1763), 67 (poor tax 1777).
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1771, 408 out of 461 parish households, or almost 90 per cent, were expected to
contribute to the capitation for the poor.98
To the extent that the poor tax base was gradually extended down the social scale
and the contribution of the highest wealth groups decreased, this effectively shifted
the tax burden to the poorer groups within the village. While the contribution
expected from the lowest wealth categories remained relatively low, this resulted in
a situation where even households on the brink of relief dependency were expected
to contribute to the financing of the poor table. In 1790, the parish priest of Leisele
again denounced the poor tax as unjust, as it effectively shifted most of the tax
burden on to poor households of artisans and labourers.99 His complaints echo the
warning by the author of An ease for overseers against excessive rates: ‘contributions
are not given to make or multiplie poore but to mitigate povertie’.100 That the
line between both could be thin was explicitly acknowledged in the preamble of a
1791 ordinance by the aldermen of Furnes, which, like many earlier ordinances,
urged local authorities not to provide relief to those ‘whose age and health allow
them to work’. One explicit reason for close scrutiny in this respect was that the
growing relief bills in most parishes had resulted in ‘heavy impositions . . . in which
are included many diligent persons who rely only on their dire labour to fulfil their
contribution’. Obliging the able-bodied to work would therefore not only accustom
them to the virtues of labour, but would also ‘relieve the burdens of those who only
with their toil and the greatest difficulty can contribute their share in the poor
taxes’.101
VI. Conclusions
The countryside of Furnes was probably the first region in the Southern Low
Countries where a marked and radical transition took place in the financing of
local poor relief institutions in the second half of the eighteenth century. The
advance of large-scale commercial farming led to growing relief demands in ways
similar to those observed for the commercial grain-growing areas of the English
south-east. These pressures formed the background for a transformation of the
institutional layout of parochial poor tables from a relatively informal system to
a formalized one where criteria for entitlement as well as exclusion became more
clearly delineated and monitored, and which in many respects displayed features
considered characteristic of the English poor law. As the proceeds of voluntary
charity proved insufficient to sustain the increase in relief expenses, poor taxes
spread rapidly to become a structural and major source of poor table revenue in
the second half of the eighteenth century.
This transition was accompanied by intra-village conflicts over the question
of how to distribute these poor taxes. The examples unearthed so far suggest that
large-scale farmers used their political influence to support alternative distributions
whereby part of the poor tax burden was effectively shifted to themiddling and poor
village groups. While a comprehensive appraisal of costs and benefits has to await
98 SAB, OA Alveringem, uncatalogued (poor tax 1771).
99 SAB, APKV, 2174.
100 An ease, p. 17, cited in Hindle, On the parish, p. 374.
101 SAB, Collection of ordinances, 7 Dec. 1791.
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further research, including detailed reconstructions of the profile of relief recipients,
we consider it likely that the expansion of relief provisions, in combination with
the stricter circumscription of settlement and entitlement and a broadening of the
poor tax base, resulted in a net subsidy to large-scale farmers. This occurred, first,
by providing de facto wage subsidies to the ‘local’ poor (even if directed mainly
towards vulnerable life-cycle phases), and by increasing the supply of labour via the
requirement to work, in ways reminiscent of the arguments of Boyer and others for
the English south-east; and second, and possibly more fundamentally, by providing
a simple means to excludemigrant workers from relief provisions without inhibiting
their mobility, a mechanism that has so far received much less attention in English
historiography, and perhaps unjustly so.
It should be clear from the evidence discussed here that the spread of poor
taxes in the district of Furnes was not a top-down development. While legally
possible from the seventeenth century, poor taxes became widespread only when
and where social and economic change presented new and profound challenges to
the financing of poor relief. As was the case with settlement practices, local and
regional authorities experimented and implemented their own solutions. Local
autonomy and bargaining, much more than centralist or legislative measures,
governed the spread of poor taxes. In that sense, the developments described for
the district of Furnes suggest that agrarian capitalism was the main driving force
behind the reorganization of poor relief. The data show that by the end of the
eighteenth century relief expenses in the area were comparable to average levels in
England andWales in terms of farm wage equivalents. Although this was still lower
than levels in the south-east—which by all indications were among the highest in
England and Wales—the results do demonstrate that certain Continental regions
developed relief regimes that were less different from English practices than is
often envisaged, although it remains an open-ended question to what extent these
similarities extended into the widening of eligibility criteria towards the able-bodied
poor.
Rather than assuming a priori differences in poor relief systems on the basis of
differences in the legislative framework, then, we believe a regional focus on social
and economic change may prove a more fruitful approach to examining the causes
and consequences of different pre-modern welfare regimes. This proposition calls
for further comparative research into both English and Continental regions in the
wider North Sea area where large-scale commercial farming developed, in order
to qualify further the causal relations between poor relief and agrarian capitalism.
Although more research is required, the available evidence suggests that also in
northern France and the Netherlands, regions characterized by large farms and
labour mobility developed similar relief practices.102 In that respect, the insights
derived from the case of Furnes and further comparative research may help to
reappraise the direction of some of the causal dynamics attributed to the English
relief system: rather than a consequence of the old poor law, the economic and
102 In large parts of northern France, the introduction of settlement legislation was accompanied by prohibitions
on begging and the introduction of poor taxes. At the end of the eighteenth century some 55 per cent of relief
funds in the countryside was raised via poor taxes. Dieudonne´, Statistique, vol. 3, p. 190; Lefebvre, Les paysans,
pp. 313–20; Legay, Les e´tats, pp. 310–16. Conflicts about poor taxes in villages are documented in de Saint-Le´ger
and Sagnac, Les cahiers. On the Netherlands, see Lambrecht, ‘Agrarian change’, pp. 218–19.
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social transformations towards agrarian capitalism might be reappraised as the
main causal dynamics feeding ‘English’ relief practices.
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